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ARBITRARY ARBITERS: EVALUATING THE RIGHT TO BE
INFORMED OF ELIGIBILITY FOR DISCRETIONARY
RELIEF IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
Michael Jordan*
The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against
arbitrary action of government.1
INTRODUCTION
In 2007, Emilio Estrada, a lawful permanent resident, “pleaded guilty to possession
of a firearm by an unlawful user of a controlled substance.”2 He was subsequently
placed in removal proceedings and deported.3 While it was possible that Mr. Estrada
had an avenue of relief from deportation under section 212(h) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act,4 he was never informed of this possibility—either by the immi-
gration judge (IJ) or his attorneys5—despite the fact that the IJ is obligated under
federal regulations to “inform the alien of his or her apparent eligibility to apply for
any of the benefits enumerated in this chapter,”6 including “[r]elief from removal.”7
In a subsequent appeal, Mr. Estrada argued that the failure of his attorneys to
inform him of his possible relief under section 212(h) violated his Fifth Amendment
due-process rights.8 To succeed, Mr. Estrada had to show that his deportation pro-
ceeding was “fundamentally unfair,” or, in other words, he had to “show both a due
process violation emanating from defects in the underlying deportation proceeding
and resulting prejudice.”9 Further, to find a due-process violation, Mr. Estrada would
* JD Candidate, 2020, William & Mary Law School; MA, 2014, New York University; BA,
2012, University of Virginia. I am grateful to the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal staff for
their thoughtful input and editing, to Professor Evan Criddle for teaching me the intricacies of
immigration law, to the attorneys and staff at Joseph & Hall P.C. who first inspired me to pursue
my study of immigration law, and finally, to my family—Betty, Hamilton, Jenn, John, Ray,
Stephen, Faye, Marie, Eddie, Bethie, Gary, Inday, Sean and Maybelline—for their support.
1 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (citing Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S.
114, 123 (1889)).
2 United States v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885, 886 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct.
2623 (2018).
3 Id.
4 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012).
5 Estrada, 876 F.3d at 886.
6 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) (2013).
7 See id. § 1240.8(d) (emphasis omitted).
8 Estrada, 876 F.3d at 886.
9 Id. at 887 (citation omitted).
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first have to “establish that [he] has been deprived of a life, liberty, or property in-
terest sufficient to trigger the protection of the Due Process Clause in the first place.”10
However, in finding no due-process violation, the Sixth Circuit in United States v.
Estrada reaffirmed that “an alien has no constitutional right to be informed of eli-
gibility for, or to be considered for, discretionary relief,” and claimed to join “the
majority of our sister circuits,” citing decisions from the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh,
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.11
Circuit courts are indeed split over the issue. Collapsing the circuit decisions
above as the “majority” addressing the issue is, however, misleading.12 Only three of
the circuits—the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth—in the cases relied upon above actually
addressed the narrower issue of whether there exists a constitutional due-process
obligation to inform a person in removal proceedings of possible eligibility of relief.13
The Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits instead focused solely on the question of
whether respondents were entitled to discretionary relief when respondents in removal
proceedings allegedly met eligibility requirements.14 The Third Circuit explicitly
avoided deciding the issue.15 On the other hand, the Second and Ninth Circuits,
10 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ashki v. INS, 233 F.3d 913, 921 (6th Cir. 2000)).
11 Id. at 888 (citations omitted).
12 Id.
13 See United States v. Santiago-Ochoa, 447 F.3d 1015, 1020 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A] majority
of circuits have rejected the proposition that there is a constitutional right to be informed of
eligibility for—or to be considered for—discretionary relief. . . . We now join the majority of
circuits.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199, 1205 (10th Cir.
2004) (“We agree with the majority of other circuits which have addressed the issue and con-
cluded that there is no constitutional right to be informed of the existence of discretionary
relief for which a potential deportee might be eligible.” (emphasis added)); United States v.
Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Because eligibility for § 212(c) relief is not
a liberty or property interest warranting due process protection, we hold that the Immigration
Judge’s error in failing to explain Lopez-Ortiz’s eligibility does not rise to the level of
fundamental unfairness. . . . Lopez-Ortiz’s removal hearing did not violate his right to due
process . . . .” (emphasis added)).
14 See Smith v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 425, 430 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Smith had no protected
liberty or property interest in discretionary 212(c) relief, a circumstance fatal to his due process
claim.”); Oguejiofor v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 277 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11th Cir. 2002)
(“[A]n alien has no constitutionally-protected right to discretionary relief or to be eligible for
discretionary relief. Therefore, Petitioner can assert no due process challenge to the BIA’s
conclusion that Petitioner was ineligible for discretionary relief . . . .”); Escudero-Corona v. Bd.
of Immigration Appeals, 244 F.3d 608, 615 (8th Cir. 2001) (“‘[E]ligibility for suspension is
not a right protected by the Constitution. Suspension of deportation is rather an act of grace
that rests in the unfettered discretion of the Attorney General.’ We find this reasoning to be
persuasive and conclude there has been no due process . . . violation.” (citation omitted)).
15 See Bonhometre v. Gonzalez, 414 F.3d 442, 444 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[W]e make no
judgment as to whether or not the failure of an Immigration Judge or the Board of Immigration
Appeals to advise an alien of the multitude of forms of relief that may be available to him . . . is
a denial of his Fifth Amendment procedural due process rights.”).
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which decide the majority of immigration cases,16 have held that there is such a
right.17 In June of 2018, the Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari
to resolve the issue.18 The Supreme Court’s recent denial of a petition for certiorari
in the Estrada case and the ongoing circuit split effectively mean that persons in
removal proceedings in different states will continue to arbitrarily receive different
procedural treatment for similar issues.
This Note argues that an individual in removal proceedings does have a consti-
tutional due process right to be informed of possible discretionary relief and that not
doing so subverts notions of fairness, especially given that the respondent relies upon
the IJ to play a significant administrative role in developing the record in the case.19
Indeed, if the immigration court fails to inform respondents with apparent eligibility
for relief20 and they fail to assert such a claim, they will likely be foreclosed from
doing so on appeal due to exhaustion requirements,21 thereby hindering any subse-
quent efforts to rectify the error. Removal proceedings already lack many of the
hallmarks of procedural due process, such as the right to a court-appointed attorney
for an indigent respondent.22 Without assistance of a court-appointed attorney, or the
IJ charged with informing him under the regulation, the notion of adequate due pro-
cess for a respondent in removal proceedings is little more than fiction. And where
the immigration judge may eschew their regulatory duty to inform a respondent in
removal proceedings of apparent eligibility for relief without consequence, the ex-
periences of similarly situated respondents will be arbitrary.
16 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Estrada v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2623 (2018)
(No. 17-1233) (“[T]he Second and Ninth Circuits . . . decide the vast majority of immigration
appeals . . . .”).
17 See United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 896–97 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We
have repeatedly held that an IJ’s failure to . . . advise an alien [of his or her ‘apparent eli-
gibility’ for relief] violates due process.”); United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir.
2004) (“The issue . . . is not whether Section 212(c) relief is constitutionally mandated, but
whether a denial of an established right to be informed of the possibility of such relief can,
if prejudicial, be a fundamental procedural error. We believe that it can.”).
18 Estrada, 138 S. Ct. 2623.
19 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2012) (“The immigration judge shall administer oaths,
receive evidence, and interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses.
The immigration judge may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and presentation
of evidence.”); Copeland, 376 F.3d at 71 (“Given that IJs have a duty to develop the adminis-
trative record, and that many aliens are uncounseled, our removal system relies on IJs to
explain the law accurately to pro se aliens. Otherwise, such aliens would have no way of know-
ing what information was relevant to their cases and would be practically foreclosed from
making a case against removal.”).
20 See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) (2013).
21 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (2012) (“A court may review a final order of removal only if—(1)
the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right . . . .”).
22 Id. § 1362 (“In any removal proceedings before an immigration judge . . . the person
concerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the Government)
by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose.”).
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Like the Second Circuit, I argue that the majority of circuits that have weighed
in on this issue of procedural due process have improperly analyzed the liberty or
property interest at stake. For instance, the key in the Sixth Circuit’s determination
that the disclosure of such information was not mandatory was the fact that the
“suspension of deportation is discretionary[ ] [and] does not create a protectable
liberty or property interest.”23 However, as the Second Circuit noted, there is a dis-
tinction between a right to the suspension of removal proceedings and a right to be
informed of the possibility of seeking discretionary suspension of deportation pro-
ceedings.24 Here, I argue that current immigration regulations create a cognizable
property or liberty interest in the act of being informed of eligibility for seeking
discretionary relief itself, regardless of the ultimate discretionary decision.25 Simply
put, while there may not be a right to the discretionary relief sought, there does exist
a right to be informed of the possibility.
In supporting this position, I draw on: (1) case law regarding “property” and
“liberty” interests for the purposes of procedural due process;26 (2) commentary
undermining the notion that removal proceedings are “purely” civil and, hence, en-
titled to fewer procedural due process protections;27 and (3) policy considerations
that emphasize the uniqueness of immigration proceedings and the heightened im-
portance of finding a constitutionally protected liberty interest given that discretionary
relief might be an alien’s only defense, deportation has serious consequences,28 aliens
in removal proceedings are often unrepresented by counsel,29 and immigration judges
have unique responsibilities to establish the record during removal proceedings.30
In Part I, I analyze the history of due process protections in the immigration
context and the state of such protections today.31 Part II dives deeper into the circuit
split on the issue of the right to be informed of possible discretionary relief in
23 United States v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885, 888 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashki v. INS, 233
F.3d 913, 921 (6th Cir. 2000)), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2623 (2018).
24 Copeland, 376 F.3d at 72 (“Critical to our reasoning . . . is the distinction between a
right to seek relief and the right to that relief itself . . . . The decisions holding that a failure to
inform an alien about Section 212(c) relief cannot be a fundamental error collapse this distinc-
tion and incorrectly assume that, because the grant of Section 212(c) relief is itself discretionary,
the denial of a Section 212(c) hearing cannot be a fundamental procedural error.”).
25 See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) (creating the unambiguous expectation that the IJ will
“inform the alien of his or her apparent eligibility” for relief).
26 See infra Section II.A.
27 See infra Section II.B.
28 See infra notes 189–93 and accompanying text.
29 See Ingrid Eagly & Steven Shafer, Special Report, Access to Counsel in Immigration
Court, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 2 (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil
.org/research/access-counsel-immigration-court [https://perma.cc/9P7P-8SFB] (“Nationally,
only 37 percent of all immigrants secured legal representation in their removal cases. . . .
Only 14 percent of detained immigrants acquired legal counsel . . . .”).
30 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
31 See infra Part I.
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removal proceedings and presents: (A) themes in the majority opinions; (B) themes
in the minority opinions; and (C) reasons supporting the latter.32 Part III elaborates
on additional reasons enumerated above that support the minority position in these
cases.33 Finally, Part IV briefly offers recommendations to better safeguard constitu-
tional procedural due process protections in the immigration context in light of the
issue to be informed of possible discretionary relief.34
I. HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF DUE PROCESS IN THE IMMIGRATION CONTEXT
A. Brief History of Due Process in the Immigration Context35
Due process protections have long been construed narrowly in the immigration
context in the United States due in large measure to the great deference that courts
have afforded the legislative branch in developing policies regarding who is a desirable
immigrant and the executive branch in using its discretion to weed out those who
are not.36 The roots of such deference and discretion stem from the notion of jus soli,
or “right of the soil,” from medieval England granting “the right to remain within the
territory of a sovereign—or the right not to be deported.”37 It was in contradistinction
to this right to remain in a given territory—a fundamental concept of our modern
conception of citizenship—that American colonies first drew lines “between insiders,
or ‘subjects,’ and outsiders, or ‘aliens.’”38 Indeed, at this time, colonial governments
32 See infra Part II.
33 See infra Part III.
34 See infra Part IV.
35 See generally BILL ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA: THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY
(2004) (exploring how policymakers and groups try to define American identity through immi-
gration policy at key moments throughout U.S. history); DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION
NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2007) (charting the development of deportation
policy in the United States, beginning in the colonies); DEIRDRE M. MOLONEY, NATIONAL
INSECURITIES: IMMIGRANTS AND U.S. DEPORTATION POLICY SINCE 1882 (2012) (exploring
the development of U.S. immigration policies through the lenses of race, ethnicity, gender,
and class throughout U.S. history); GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION:
IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996) (discussing undesirable categories
of “strangers” through U.S. history and the lack of constitutional protections extended to these
groups); LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING
OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995) (analyzing legal debates surrounding Chinese immi-
gration in the late nineteenth century and the efforts of Chinese immigrants to contest policies
related to the same); DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION
CONTROL IN AMERICA (2002) (providing detailed timeline of key immigration legislation and
demonstrates how distinct political coalitions formed to advance certain types of policies
throughout U.S. history); DANIEL WILSHER, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: LAW, HISTORY, POLI-
TICS (2012) (discussing the legal development of current immigration policies in the U.S. and
the U.K. through a historical lens).
36 See infra notes 38–78 and accompanying text.
37 KANSTROOM, supra note 35, at 23.
38 Id.
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used such distinctions to expel outsiders with undesirable ideologies and religions,39
the poor,40 and convicts.41
However, the weight given to the early colonial governments to determine who
was a desirable immigrant was squarely confronted with emerging philosophies that
celebrated the equality of man, including, in this case, foreigners.42 As the eighteenth
century progressed, new ideas about the natural rights of man and social contract theory
began to counteract strict, medieval notions of “subjectship” that made such exclu-
sionary policies more contested.43 Natural rights theory supported “the development
of liberal principles of economics and constitutionalism [that] marched together to en-
hance the status of aliens[,] . . . increasing recognition of [their] equality to act on
the market [and] stripping away old restrictions based upon privileges and status.”44
Consider the familiar language of the Declaration of Independence: “We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness.”45 Indeed, one of the grievances listed to King George III in
39 There was especially a worry among the colonies about the arrival of the newcomers
“whose moral or social characteristics would introduce in America the decadence and corrup-
tion of Europe.” Id. at 30 (quoting MARILYN C. BASLER, “ASYLUM FOR MANKIND”: AMERICA
1607–1800, at 150 (1998)). Kanstroom highlights a number of such policies:
In 1643, a Virginia law ordered Catholic priests to be deported within
five days of their arrival. By 1717, Pennsylvania’s council, concerned
about the entry of “great numbers of Foreigners from Germany, strangers
to our Language and Constitutions,” ordered shipmasters to provide lists
of incoming passengers and required all immigrants to take loyalty oaths
upon arrival. A Connecticut exclusion and deportation law in 1743, aimed
at Moravian immigrants, was entitled “Act providing Relief against the
evil and dangerous Designs of Foreigners and Suspected Persons.”
Id. at 30 (citations omitted).
40 Colonial removal policies targeting poor newcomers drew upon
English practices, going back to the sixteenth century, that permitted local
officials to remove beggars “to the next constable, and so from constable
to constable, til they be brought to the place where they were born or most
conversant for the space of three years, there to be nourished of alms.”
Id. at 33–34 (quoting JANE PERRY CLARK, DEPORTATION OF ALIENS FROM THE UNITED
STATES TO EUROPE 33 (1931)). For instance, in New England, colonies developed a “warning-
out” system—akin to our modern deportation system—that scrutinized whether “transients”
without settlements merited remaining in a locality, wherein the process was “discretionary”
and the consequences meant forced removal. Id. at 35–37.
41 In the 1700s, colonial thinkers were increasingly concerned over the large number of
convicts sent from Great Britain to the colonies under the indentured servitude program, and
the early congress called upon the states “to pass proper laws for preventing the transportation
of convicted malefactors from foreign countries.” Id. at 42.
42 WILSHER, supra note 35, at ix.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
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the Declaration complained that his immigration policies toward the colonies were
too restrictive.46 As Judith Shklar noted, “[N]atural[-]rights theory makes it very
difficult to find good reasons for excluding anyone from full political membership
in a modern republic.”47
Understanding this fundamental tension between discretion rooted in policies
deciding which immigrants are desirable and natural rights notions that all persons
are equal helps inform the way in which due process protections—enshrined in the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution48—have been interpreted narrowly in the
immigration context from the earliest years of our republic until today. Such tension
was on full display with the passage of some of the first major pieces of federal
legislation targeting immigrants—the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.49 Amidst
growing concern of possible war with France, the United States Congress passed
this series of legislation to target “dangerous” pro-French immigrants.50 The perti-
nent provision of the Acts, granting discretion to the Executive regarding removal
reads, “[I]t shall be lawful for the President of the United States at any time during
the continuance of this act, to order all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to
the peace and safety of the United States . . . to depart out of the territory . . . .”51
However, James Madison—one of the critics of the measure—expressed alarm at
the due process implications of the law, writing:
The ground of suspicion is to be judged of, not by any judicial
authority, but by the executive magistrate alone. No oath or
affirmation is required. . . . [The President] may order the sus-
pected alien to depart . . . without the opportunity of avoiding
the sentence by finding pledges for his future good conduct, . . .
the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended . . . .52
Madison further countered any argument that such measures were purely civil,
public safety measures, noting that:
46 KANSTROOM, supra note 35, at 30.
47 Id. at 24 (quoting JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLU-
SION 37 (1991)).
48 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
49 Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798); Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798); Act
of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798); Naturalization Act, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (1798).
50 Alien and Sedition Acts, BRITANNICA CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA (2017), https://search
.credoreference.com/content/entry/ebconcise/alien_and_sedition_acts/0 [https://perma.cc
/KQ9Z-PU4H] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
51 Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, 570–71 (1798).
52 Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 555 (Washington,
Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter Madison’s Report].
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[I]t can never be admitted that the removal of aliens, authorized
by the act, is to be considered, not as punishment for an offence,
but as a measure of precaution and prevention. If the banishment
of an alien from a country into which he has been invited as the
asylum most auspicious to his happiness,—a country where he
may have formed the most tender connections; where he may
have invested his entire property, and acquired property of the
real and permanent, as well as the movable and temporary kind;
where he enjoys, under the laws, a greater share of the blessings
of personal security, and personal liberty, than he can elsewhere
hope for; and where he may have nearly completed his proba-
tionary title to citizenship . . . if a banishment of this sort be not
a punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be
difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can be applied.53
In this way, the earliest moments of United States legislative history revealed con-
gressional interests in extending vast powers of discretion to the executive branch
to determine which types of immigrants should be permitted to remain in the country
based on public safety concerns, as well as natural rights concerns regarding funda-
mental due process protections for the persons facing the brunt of that discretion.
The first instances where the Supreme Court grappled with procedural due process
protections for immigrants came in the late nineteenth century when the federal
government began to consolidate its authority over immigration in order to control
the entry of Chinese into the country.54 Here, the Court drew lines between immigrants
seeking admission to the United States and those fighting deportation proceedings.55
For those seeking entry, the Supreme Court in The Chinese Exclusion Case extended
no meaningful review of a denial of entry, upholding the exclusion of a Chinese person
with proper admission documents based on deference to the legislative and executive
53 Id.
54 See KANSTROOM, supra note 35, at 92.
55 See infra notes 58–75 and accompanying text; see also Walter S. Gindin, (Potentially)
Resolving the Ever-Present Debate over Whether Noncitizens in Removal Proceedings Have
a Due-Process Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 96 IOWA L. REV. 669, 678 (2011)
(discussing the history of due process in the immigration context as it pertains to access to
counsel). Also note that prior to 1996, exclusion proceedings were used to determine a nonciti-
zen’s eligibility for admission to the United States, while deportation proceedings were used
to try to remove a noncitizen who had previously been admitted to the United States from the
country. Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 261 (2012) (“Exclusion hearings were held for cer-
tain aliens seeking entry to the United States, and deportation hearings were held for certain
aliens who had already entered this country.”). After 1996, these types of proceedings were
consolidated into one, known as the removal proceeding, but the grounds invoked for the
proceedings—inadmissibility grounds related to exclusion and deportability grounds related
to expulsion—remain distinct. See id. at 262–63.
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branches.56 The Court observed that such authority was inherent in the sovereignty
of the government, writing, “The government, possessing the powers which are to be
exercised for protection and security, is clothed with authority to determine the occasion
on which the powers shall be called forth; and its determination . . . [is] necessarily
conclusive upon all its departments and officers,” including such determinations
regarding “the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country . . . . [which] is
conclusive upon the judiciary.”57 Indeed, building off of the discretion observed in
early United States history with the Alien and Sedition Acts toward aliens, scholars
have noted that this case pronounced what would come to be known as the plenary
power58 doctrine, wherein “the federal government enjoys plenary authority to dic-
tate the terms and conditions for noncitizens seeking entry into the United States.”59
The Supreme Court extended recognition of such plenary power to its decisions
regarding which noncitizens to expel from the country in Fong Yue Ting v. United
States.60 There, similar to The Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court observed that “[t]he
power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting international relations, is
vested in the political departments of the government,” and the Court noted that “[t]he
power of Congress, therefore, to expel, like the power to exclude aliens, or any spe-
cified class of aliens, from the country, may be exercised entirely through executive
officers.”61 One of the underpinnings of the Court’s rationale was the notion that such
a proceeding is purely civil in nature. Indeed, the Court wrote, “The [removal] pro-
ceeding before a United States judge . . . is in no proper sense a trial and sentence for
a crime or offense,” and that “[t]he order of deportation is not a punishment for crime,”
but instead “[i]t is but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an
alien who has not complied with the conditions upon the performance of which the
government of the nation . . . has determined that his continuing to reside here shall
depend.”62 Because the proceeding was not criminal, the Court observed that the
noncitizen in removal proceedings “has not . . . been deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.”63 Despite the assertion here of no due process
violation, the Court more generally in Fong Yue Ting did hint at exceptions that
would allow for judicial interference, including when “authorized by treaty or by
statute, or [as] required by the paramount law of the Constitution.”64
56 130 U.S. 581, 606–11 (1889).
57 Id. at 606.
58 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “plenary power” as “[p]ower that is broadly construed;
esp., a court’s power to dispose of any matter properly before it.” Plenary Power, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
59 Gindin, supra note 55, at 677; see also David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary
Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29, 30 (2015).
60 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
61 Id. at 713–14.
62 Id. at 730.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 713.
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The Court more fully addressed these constitutional concerns regarding the
removal of a noncitizen resident of the United States in The Japanese Immigrant
Case.65 There, the Court began by reaffirming the plenary power of the Government
“to exclude or expel aliens” and reiterating that “the order of an executive officer,
invested with the power to determine finally the facts upon which an alien’s right
to enter this country, or remain in it, . . . was ‘due process of law.’”66 But, contrary
to Fong Yue Ting, the Court here noted that such executive orders may not “disregard
the fundamental principles that inhere in ‘due process of law’ as understood at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution.”67 The Court elaborated on the types of protections
that should be extended to noncitizens in removal proceedings, including a hearing,
writing, “One of these [fundamental due process] principles is that no person shall
be deprived of his liberty without opportunity, at some time, to be heard, before such
officers, in respect of the matters upon which that liberty depends.”68 The Court also
noted that such due process principles include a right from arbitrary proceedings and
a right for the noncitizen to articulate reasons in defense of deportation.69 It wrote:
[I]t is not competent for . . . any executive officer . . . arbitrarily
to cause an alien, who has entered the country, and has become
subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its popula-
tion . . . to be taken into custody and deported without giving
him all opportunity to be heard upon the questions involving his
right to be and remain in the United States.70
Therefore, the substantive due process interest identified by the Court encompassed
a noncitizen’s right to be free from arbitrary detention, while the procedural due
process protections must have included at a minimum a hearing, freedom from
arbitrary proceedings, and a right to be heard.71 Similar to Madison’s earlier obser-
vations regarding the heavy consequences of possible expulsion from the country,72
the Court seemed to give considerable weight to private considerations in extending
due process protections to noncitizens, despite its re-invocation of the broad author-
ity of Congress to determine the grounds for such expulsion.73
From the mid-twentieth century to the present, the Supreme Court has continued
to afford disparate constitutional treatment to noncitizens seeking entry or admission
to the United States and those who have already been admitted. For the former, due
65 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
66 Id. at 100 (quoting Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 100–01.
69 Id. at 101.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 100–02.
72 See Madison’s Report, supra note 52, at 555.
73 The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. at 100–01.
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process protections have been construed especially narrowly. For instance, in United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, the Court curtailed any possible substantive
due process of a “right” to enter the United States for a wife seeking to be reunited
with her U.S. citizen husband, holding that “an alien who seeks admission to this
country may not do so under any claim of right,” and finding instead that such “[a]d-
mission of aliens . . . is a privilege granted by the sovereign United States Govern-
ment.”74 Therefore procedurally, the Court held, “Whatever the procedure authorized
by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”75
Therefore, constitutional protections do not serve noncitizens seeking entry.
However, the Supreme Court has continued to hold that constitutional pro-
tections attach once a noncitizen has been admitted to the United States, and can
even follow a lawful permanent resident abroad. For instance, in Kwong Hai Chew
v. Colding, the Court held that a lawful permanent resident seaman who left the
United States to work aboard a U.S. merchant vessel was entitled to Fifth Amend-
ment due process protections upon his return, and that his detention “without notice
of the charges against him and without opportunity to be heard in opposition to
them” was insufficient procedurally.76 However, the Court has indicated that a pro-
longed absence from the United States may cause a lawful permanent resident to
lose such constitutional protections,77 and Congress has adopted similar legislation
providing that a lawful permanent resident’s status can be abandoned or relinquished
following a trip abroad for several grounds, including an absence of longer than 180
days.78 Despite these exceptions, however, it is clear from the Supreme Court
jurisprudence discussed above that noncitizens already admitted to the United States
are generally entitled to the due process protections of the Fifth Amendment.79
By way of summary, early debates regarding immigration policies and Supreme
Court jurisprudence might be characterized as having a core tension between affording
the political branches of government wide discretion to enact and execute immigra-
tion policies for its interests in sovereignty and national security, while recognizing
that constitutional protections extend to certain classes of noncitizen residents,
especially given their established ties to the United States and weighty interests in
avoiding the grave consequences of expulsion.
74 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
75 Id. at 544.
76 344 U.S. 590, 602–03 (1953); see also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 21–22 (1982)
(holding that a lawful permanent resident who left the United States for a brief trip of a few
days was still entitled to the protections of the Due Process Clause).
77 See Shaughnessy v. United States ex. rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 273–74 (1953) (holding
that a lawful permanent resident who left the United States for nineteen months without
previously obtaining authorization for reentry was not entitled due process protections upon
his attempt to reenter the country and was instead treated as an alien seeking admission),
superseded by statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (2012).
78 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13).
79 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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B. Current Due Process Protections in Civil Proceedings
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall . . .
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”80 The Supreme
Court has interpreted this clause, and its similar appearance in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,81 as applied to the states as containing both procedural and substantive due
process components.82 Substantive due process refers to the essence of what is being
deprived—the life, liberty, and property of the individual.83 Here, the Court has con-
strued property as applying to “interests that a person has already acquired in specific
benefits” ranging from real property to statutory and administrative benefits, or bene-
fits that a person “[has] a legitimate claim of entitlement to,” rather than an “abstract
need or desire for it” nor “a unilateral expectation of it.”84 For instance, in Goldberg
v. Kelly, the Court held that “welfare recipients . . . had a claim of entitlement to
welfare payments that was grounded in the statute defining eligibility for them.”85
Liberty interests, on the other hand, have been defined by reference to two
criteria.86 First, “the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights
and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tra-
dition,’ . . . and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’”87 Second, “substantive-due-process
cases [require] a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest,”
that refers to “[o]ur Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices . . . [as] crucial
‘guideposts for responsible decisionmaking’ . . . that direct and restrain our exposi-
tion of the Due Process Clause.”88 Examples of liberty interests include “freedoms
protected by the Bill of Rights . . . the rights to marry . . . to have children . . . to
direct the education and upbringing of one’s children . . . to marital privacy . . . to
use contraception . . . to bodily integrity . . . and to abortion.”89
Procedural due process refers instead to the administrative safeguards that the
state must afford individuals prior to depriving them of their substantive due process
right described above.90 The lines between these two categories of due process rights—
substantive and procedural—are strict. The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he
80 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
81 Id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”).
82 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119–24 (1989).
83 See, e.g., Deshaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194–96 (1989).
84 Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1972).
85 Id. at 577 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
86 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997).
87 Id. (internal citations omitted).
88 Id. at 721 (internal citations omitted).
89 Id. at 719–20 (internal citations omitted).
90 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
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categories of substance and procedure are distinct. . . . ‘Property’ cannot be defined
by the procedures provided for its deprivation any more than can life or liberty.”91
In the civil context, the Supreme Court has held that a state actor must take into
account both public and private interests, as well as the risk of “erroneous depriva-
tion” of one’s liberty or property interest, in order to determine whether a given
procedural protection is needed.92 This balancing test was announced in Mathews
v. Eldridge, where the Court observed that:
[T]he specific dictates of due process generally requires consid-
eration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will
be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probative value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.93
For instance, there the Court held that “an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to
the termination of disability benefits” through its determination that the current
procedures—including medical reports weighing in on the need of the disability
benefits—were adequate to avoid erroneous results, that the private interest was
lessened because the benefit was based not solely on financial need, and that the
financial burdens to the state in providing evidentiary hearings on the issue would
outweigh such need.94
A determination of what procedures are needed prior to depriving individuals
of their life, liberty, or property then mirrors the tension that courts faced early on in
the immigration context when reconciling the government’s interest in public safety
and deciding which immigrants are desirable, with a noncitizen’s private interest in
remaining in his home in the country.
C. Current Due Process Protections Afforded Noncitizens in Removal Proceedings
As noted previously in The Japanese Immigrant Case, the due process protec-
tions of the Fifth Amendment have been extended to immigrants in removal pro-
ceedings,95 a general proposition that has consistently been reaffirmed by the courts.96
91 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
92 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35.
93 Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263–71 (1976)).
94 Id. at 332–49.
95 189 U.S. 86, 100–02 (1903).
96 See, e.g., Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[O]ur case law makes
clear that, as a general matter, aliens who have entered the United States, legally or illegally,
are entitled to the protections of the Fifth Amendment.” (emphasis added)).
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While “the Supreme Court has not identified all of the procedural safeguards that
must be afforded to aliens in removal proceedings,” there are a number of key due
process protections that have been identified, including “that aliens ‘be provided (1)
notice of the charges against [them], (2) a hearing before an executive or administra-
tive tribunal, and (3) a fair opportunity to be heard.’”97 In addition, while noncitizens
in removal proceedings are not afforded court-appointed counsel,98 a number of
circuit courts, as well as the Board of Immigration Appeals, have upheld the right
to effective counsel in removal proceedings.99
II. ISSUES WITH THE “MAJORITY’S” CIRCUIT DECISIONS
In finding no right to be informed of possible discretionary relief for persons in
removal proceedings, the majority of circuits that have analyzed the issue have relied
on three key themes concerning: (1) the discretionary nature of the property or liberty
issue at stake; (2) the civil nature of removal proceedings; and (3) the narrow notions
of “fairness” for respondents in removal proceedings. Here, I address each in turn.
A. The Majority of Circuits Collapse the Distinction Between the Right to
Discretionary Relief and the Right to Be Informed of the Possibility of
Discretionary Relief 100
The majority of circuits collapse the distinction between the right to discretionary
relief and the right to be informed of the possibility of discretionary relief,101 which
is apparent in the manner in which they analyze the property or liberty issue at
stake.102 For instance, the relief sought in Estrada rested on INA section 212(h), which
“provide[d] that ‘[t]he Attorney General may, in his discretion, waive’ inadmissibility
for certain aliens with criminal convictions if he is satisfied that denying the alien’s
97 Darlene C. Goring, A False Sense of Security: Due Process Failures in Removal Pro-
ceedings, 56 S. TEX. L. REV. 91, 95–96 (2014) (alteration in original).
98 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012).
99 Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 638 (B.I.A. 1988) (finding that a right to
effective assistance of counsel exists where the proceeding was “so fundamentally unfair that
the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case”); Jean Pierre Espinoza, Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel in Removal Proceedings Matter of Compean and the Fundamental
Fairness Doctrine, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 65, 66 (2010) (“The Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952 (INA) set forth that aliens have the right to counsel but not at the expense of the
government. Although, in theory, courts have recognized that government-funded counsel
might be required, courts have uniformly refused to appoint government-funded counsel even
in cases where the immigrant is indigent. Despite this controversy, eight of eleven federal
circuits have sustained the constitutional right for effective assistance of counsel.”).
100 See United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 2004).
101 See id.
102 See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
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admission would result in extreme hardship to the alien’s spouse, child, or parent who
is a U.S. citizen or lawful resident . . . .”103 The court continued, “The statute’s plain lan-
guage is clear: relief under § 212(h) is discretionary. And when ‘suspension of de-
portation is discretionary, it does not create a protectable liberty or property interest.’”104
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit observed, “[A] majority of circuits have rejected
the proposition that there is a constitutional right to be informed of eligibility
for—or to be considered for—discretionary relief,”105 and “that ‘it would be hard to
show that the loss of a chance at wholly discretionary relief from removal is the kind
of deprivation of liberty or property that the due process clause is designed to
protect.’”106 The Fifth Circuit also concluded that an “Immigration Judge’s error in
failing to explain . . . eligibility [for relief under INA section 212(c)] does not rise
to the level of fundamental unfairness”107 because “[a]s a piece of legislative grace,
[section 212(c)] conveyed no rights, it conferred no status, and its denial does not
implicate the Due Process clause.”108 In short, a procedural due process violation
would only arise where the ultimate benefit sought—in their view, the discretionary
relief itself—constituted an entitlement rather than a discretionary act.
The minority of circuits did not dispute that the relief itself could not be con-
strued as a property interest because of its discretionary nature, but distinguished the
relief itself from the separate duty to inform respondents of the possibility of seeking
relief given their apparent eligibility.109 Indeed, while the Sixth, Seventh, and Fifth
Circuits above focused solely on the statutory text of the forms of relief,110 the Ninth
103 United States v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885, 888 (6th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original)
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 9982 (h)(1)(B) (2012), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2623 (2018).
104 Id. (citing Ashki v. INS, 233 F.3d 913, 921 (6th Cir. 2000)).
105 United States v. Santiago-Ochoa, 447 F.3d 1015, 1020 (7th Cir. 2006).
106 Id. (quoting United States v. Roque-Espinoza, 338 F.3d 724, 729–30 (7th Cir. 2003)).
107 United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 2002).
108 Id. (quoting Alfarache v. Cravener, 203 F.3d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 2000)).
109 See United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 2004) (“To be sure, relief
under Section 212(c) is not constitutionally mandated and is discretionary. It does not follow,
however, that where an alien is erroneously denied information regarding the right to seek
such relief, and the erroneous denial of that information results in a deportation that likely
would have been avoided if the alien was properly informed, such error is not fundamentally
unfair . . . .”); see also United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 896–97 (9th Cir.
2010) (focusing not on the ultimate discretionary relief itself to resolve the question of the
due process violation, but rather on “the extent of an IJ’s duty to inform aliens of their
eligibility for relief from removal”).
110 See United States v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885, 888 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[R]elief under [INA]
§ 212(h) is discretionary.”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2623 (2018); Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d at
231 (“§ 212(c) relief ‘was couched in conditional and permissive terms. As a piece of legis-
lative grace, it conveyed no rights, it conferred no status’, and its denial does not implicate
the Due Process clause.” (quoting Alfarache v. Cravener, 203 F.3d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 2000)));
Santiago-Ochoa, 447 F.3d at 1019–20 (“[Santiago-Ochoa] contends that his right to due
process was violated because he was not informed of his eligibility for discretionary forms
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and Second Circuits also took note of other pertinent regulations, which indicated
in unambiguous terms that the IJ possessed a duty to inform.111 Namely, 8 C.F.R.
section 1240.11(a)(2) provides that “[t]he immigration judge shall inform the alien
of his or her apparent eligibility to apply for any of the benefits enumerated in this
chapter and shall afford the alien an opportunity to make application during the
hearing . . . .”112 The repetition of the term “shall” reiterates the mandatory nature
of the duty to inform and indeed serves to create an expectation that such a duty
would be observed.113 While not noted by the minority circuits, this requirement also
appears plainly in the Department of Justice’s Immigration Court Practice Manual,
which states “[i]f the Immigration Judge decides to proceed with pleadings, he or she
advises the respondent of any relief for which the respondent appears to be eligible.”114
For the minority circuits then, the question of whether the respondent had a due
process right to be informed was an inquiry and regulatory obligation distinct from
the later analysis of whether the respondent would ultimately obtain the relief.
Consistent with the minority’s approach, the right to be informed of the possibil-
ity of seeking discretionary relief could be construed as a substantive “property”
interest in light of due process jurisprudence. In Board of Regents of State Colleges
v. Roth, the Supreme Court defined “property” with respect to its specific relation-
ship to rules or statutes, noting that “[t]o have a property interest in a benefit, a per-
son clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. . . . He must, instead,
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. . . . defined by existing rules or understand-
ings that stem from an independent source [from the Constitution] . . . .”115 As noted
above, agency regulations116 and the Immigration Court Practice Manual117 each create
a clear “expectation” for respondents that the IJ will inform them of their apparent
eligibility for relief under their duties as an immigration judge. While the Supreme
of relief such as cancellation of removal and adjustment of status . . . . [H]owever, a majority
of circuits have rejected the proposition that there is a constitutional right to be informed of
eligibility for—or to be considered for—discretionary relief.”).
111 See Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 896–97 (“Immigration regulations require an IJ to
inform an alien of ‘apparent eligibility’ for relief. . . . We have repeatedly held that an IJ’s
failure to so advise an alien violates due process . . . .”). While relief under section 212(c) and
the corresponding regulation regarding the IJ’s duty to inform respondent of his eligibility
for the relief has been repealed, they mirror the same type of analysis as in the Ninth Circuit
above. See Copeland, 376 F.3d at 72 (“[U]nder applicable regulations, an IJ must both
inform an eligible alien of his or her right to a Section 212(c) hearing and thereafter hold
such a hearing, if requested . . . .” (internal citation omitted)).
112 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) (2013) (emphasis added).
113 See id.
114 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 69 (2019) [hereinafter
IMMIGRATION MANUAL].
115 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
116 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2).
117 IMMIGRATION MANUAL, supra note 114, at 69.
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Court has noted that “‘[p]roperty’ cannot be defined by the procedures provided for
its deprivation,”118 the interest here in being informed of possible relief from removal
is not merely a procedural protection for the ultimate discretionary relief. Instead, it
is part of a larger, substantive interest that the respondent—especially when not repre-
sented by counsel119—has in having the IJ perform his or her duty to faithfully evaluate
both the grounds for removal of the respondent and any possible avenues of relief.
While not raised by the minority circuit courts, the failure of an IJ to inform a
respondent in removal proceedings of his or her apparent eligibility for relief also
implicates a procedural due process failure of the “right to be heard” for safeguarding
the more basic liberty interest in the right to be free from arbitrary bodily detention
and removal from the country.120 As noted earlier, basic due process protections for
removal proceedings include “notice,” “a hearing,” and “a fair opportunity to be
heard.”121 The failure of the IJ to inform respondents of their apparent eligibility of
relief will likely foreclose the possibility of a respondent raising the same colorable
claim for relief on appeal, as respondents are required to exhaust their remedies
before lower courts.122 Without a court-appointed attorney, and with an IJ who fails
to inform him or her of their apparent eligibility for relief, a respondent would be
hard-pressed to navigate complex immigration regulations123 to identify and assert
the claim for relief on their own. In this way, a respondent’s “right to be heard” as a
procedural protection for the ultimate disposition of their liberty interest in remaining
in the United States is severely undercut if the respondent is not entitled to informa-
tion regarding colorable claims of relief from removal from either an attorney or the
immigration judge.
118 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
119 See 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012).
120 See infra notes 121–23 and accompanying text.
121 Goring, supra note 97, at 96 (quoting United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225, 230
(5th Cir. 2002)).
122 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (2012) (“A court may review a final order of removal only if—(1)
the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right . . . .”).
123 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J.
1635, 1637–38 (2010) (“Immigration law presents special complexities. The sheer size and
chaotic layout of the principal statute and related sources of law bewilder specialists and
nonspecialists alike. The labyrinth known as the Immigration and Nationality Act governs the
admission of noncitizens to the United States, their expulsion from the United States, and a
host of miscellaneous decisions. Its five hundred pages conspire with more than one thousand
pages of administrative regulations issued by a variety of federal departments, as well as pre-
cedent decisions of administrative tribunals, executive officers, and courts, to create a byzantine
network of substantive and procedural rules of law. The organization of the statute further con-
founds nonspecialists because qualifications to many of its most important provisions appear
in distant and unexpected places. Moreover, even when the law is otherwise clear, rules that
require judges to apply broadly worded statutory or regulatory language to individualized
facts are exceptionally common, rendering outcomes highly indeterminate.” (footnotes omitted)).
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Some courts have expressed skepticism over whether procedural due process
protections can be extended to an entitlement that is procedural in nature itself.124 For
instance, in Shango v. Jurich, a prisoner alleged that a prison violated his procedural
due process rights by failing to follow the Illinois Department of Corrections’s rules
guiding such a decision.125 However, while acknowledging that “prison regulations
may give rise to . . . [a liberty] interest,” the Seventh Circuit found that his claim failed,
because “prison officials are accorded discretion under state law to transfer a prisoner
for whatever reason or for no reason at all,” and “the procedural protections of the
due process clause cannot attach, quite simply, because there is no substantive liberty
interest at stake. The existence of such discretion ‘preclude[s] the implication of a
liberty interest deserving of due process protection.’”126 In short, the court noted that
“it cannot be the right to demand needless formality.”127 With respect to the right to be
informed of relief in removal proceedings, the majority of circuits relied on a similar
logic in constantly reiterating the discretionary nature of the relief sought.128
The Seventh Circuit’s discussion of a discretionary procedure in Shango, how-
ever, stands in stark contrast to the duty incumbent upon the IJ in removal proceed-
ings.129 Specifically, the Department of Corrections regulation in Shango “d[id] not
limit the decision to transfer [a prisoner] to any particular reason,” and it was the
absence of such a limitation that allowed the court to find no liberty interest at
stake.130 In essence, the prisoner in that scenario would not have been guaranteed
any predictable outcome. With respect to an IJ’s duty to inform a respondent of their
apparent eligibility for relief, however, the regulation does oblige a specific
outcome—namely, the judge “shall inform” the respondent of their apparent eligibil-
ity for relief.131 This result is predictable and expected in a way that the regulation
governing prisoner transfers in Shango was not.132 Rather than a “needless formal-
ity,” the duty to inform provides the substantive benefit of helpful and pertinent
information to a possible defense for a respondent facing the possibility of removal
from his home.133 The majority circuits analyzing this issue failed to recognize the
124 See, e.g., Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1101–02 (7th Cir. 1982).
125 Id. at 1094–96.
126 Id. at 1099–100 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Anthony v. Wilkinson,
637 F.2d 1130, 1141 (7th Cir. 1980)).
127 Id. at 1101.
128 See, e.g., United States v. Santiago-Ochoa, 447 F.3d 1015, 1019–20 (7th Cir. 2006)
(“[Santiago-Ochoa] contends that his right to due process was violated because he was not in-
formed of his eligibility for discretionary forms of relief such as cancellation of removal and
adjustment of status. . . . [H]owever, a majority of circuits have rejected the proposition that
there is a constitutional right to be informed of eligibility for—or to be considered for—
discretionary relief.”).
129 See infra notes 130–33 and accompanying text.
130 Shango, 681 F.2d at 1100–03.
131 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) (2013).
132 Compare id., with Shango, 681 F.2d at 1100–03.
133 Compare 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2), with Shango, 681 F.2d at 1100–01.
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mandatory nature placed upon the IJ in this scenario and how such a limitation gives
rise to a liberty interest that merits procedural due process protections.
B. It Is a Fiction that Immigration Proceedings Are Purely Civil Proceedings,
and Even So, Mathews V. Eldridge Balancing Would Merit Greater Procedural
Protections for Respondents
As another prong of support, the decisions in the majority camp emphasize the
limited nature of procedural due process protections in the immigration context because
of the civil nature of immigration proceedings. For instance, the Fifth Circuit notes,
“Removal hearings are civil proceedings, not criminal; therefore, procedural protec-
tions accorded an alien in a removal proceeding are less stringent than those avail-
able to a criminal defendant.”134 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit observed, “Deportation
proceedings are, of course, civil proceedings, not criminal ones, ‘and various constitu-
tional protections associated with criminal proceedings therefore are not required.’”135
Such assertions do have support dating back to nineteenth century Supreme
Court jurisprudence,136 but scholars and recent court decisions have challenged the
persuasiveness of such dusty case law.137 Such criticism has been echoed by the Su-
preme Court as recently as 2010 in Padilla v. Kentucky, where the Court observed that,
while “deportation . . . is not . . . a criminal sanction. . . . [it] is nevertheless inti-
mately related to the criminal process.”138 The similarities of removal proceedings
134 United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225, 230 (5th Cir. 2002).
135 United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Michelson
v. INS, 897 F.2d 465, 467 (10th Cir. 1990)).
136 See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (“[A removal] pro-
ceeding before a United States judge . . . is in no proper sense a trial and sentence for a crime
or offence.”).
137 Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to
Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV.
289, 295 (2008) (“The unsettling imbalance between the grave liberty interests at stake in
removal proceedings and the relative dearth of procedural protections attaching thereto has
sparked pointed criticism of the civil label. This criticism began from the moment the civil
label was first invoked. Justice Brewer, writing in dissent in Fong Yue Ting, urged: ‘But it
needs no citation of authorities to support the proposition that deportation is punishment.
Every one knows that to be forcibly taken away from home and family and friends and business
and property, and sent across the ocean to a distant land, is punishment, and that oftentimes
most severe and cruel.’ Over the years, Justice Brewer’s words have been echoed many times
by other judges, all of whom either found themselves in the minority of their court or, not-
withstanding their own analysis, felt bound by the principle of stare decisis.” (quoting Fong
Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 740 (Brewer, J., dissenting)); see also Angela M. Banks, Deporting
Families: Legal Matter or Political Question, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 489, 490–91 (2011)
(describing the stakes of one noncitizen in removal proceedings, including descriptions of
the length of time he had spent in the country, his extensive work and family ties, and the
hardships his close family with medical conditions would suffer should he face deportation).
138 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (citations omitted).
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to criminal proceedings can be found echoed in the minority court positions regard-
ing the right to be informed of apparent eligibility for relief as well.139
Even if removal proceedings can be described as civil, they should merit more
stringent procedural due process protections under Mathews v. Eldridge.140 Under
the balancing test established by Mathews, the Supreme Court noted that “[D]ue
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands.”141 Three interests should be weighed in considering the protections needed—
namely (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probative value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the
Government’s interest, including the function involved in the fiscal and administra-
tive burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”142
Applying the analysis laid out to the question of whether the IJ’s duty to inform
the respondent of apparent eligibility for relief, leads to the conclusion that perform-
ing such function should be required. Here, the private interest is great, as a respon-
dent in removal proceedings potentially faces banishment from the country, their
home, their family, their friends, and their work.143 The government interest is also
great, because it is charged with safeguarding the country from immigrants that pose
risks to the community, while also keeping administrative and financial burdens at
a minimum. However, the decisive factor here is the risk of erroneous deprivation
of the respondent’s interest without the procedure requested.
In removal proceedings, respondents are faced with the daunting task of facing
complicated immigration regulations on their own without the right to court-appointed
counsel,144 and they will be severely hindered in presenting a defense without being
informed of their eligibility for possible forms of discretionary relief. Such a procedure
would not impose too great a burden on the government, because the IJ already per-
forms a role in developing the administrative record145 and will have the pertinent
information readily available. Further, such procedure is unlikely to lead to frivolous
claims because the judge can perform a gatekeeping function through observance
of the “apparent eligibility” requirement146 by only informing those respondents who
139 United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 72–73 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Deportation usually
has very serious consequences . . . [‘D]eportation is a drastic measure and at times the
equivalent of banishment or exile . . . .’” (quoting Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)
(alteration in original))).
140 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
141 Id. at 334 (alteration in original) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
142 Id. at 335.
143 Madison’s Report, supra note 52, at 555.
144 See 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012).
145 United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 2004) (“IJs have a duty to develop
the administrative record, and . . . our removal system relies on IJs to explain the law ac-
curately to pro se aliens.”).
146 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) (2013).
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clearly meet the eligibility requirements for a given form of discretionary relief.
Other scholars have reached similar conclusions in reviewing other procedures in
removal proceedings.147
C. The “Majority” Construe Notions of “Fairness” for Respondents in Removal
Proceedings Unduly Narrowly
Finally, the majority of circuits construe notions of “fairness” for respondents
in removal proceedings narrowly that favor the prosecution. For instance, the Eighth
Circuit observes that in removal proceedings, “The Due Process Clause requires
only that an alien receive notice and a fair hearing where the INS must prove by
clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the alien is subject to deportation.”148
However, this notion of fairness precludes assurances of predictability during pro-
ceedings for respondents, as well as hinders the government’s ability to effectively
use its limited resources to prioritize the removal of aliens.
For the majority of circuits to reach a finding that there is no constitutionally pro-
tected interest to be informed of the possibility of discretionary relief, they must also
find that the Executive Office for Immigration Review does not need to follow its own
regulations,149 resulting in unpredictability for respondents. Indeed, under the majority’s
rationale, the IJ can choose not to comply with his or her regulatory obligation to
inform a respondent of their apparent eligibility for relief or not150 without ramifica-
tions, because the judiciary will not enforce a failure to observe such a procedure.151
Following government regulations in some instances and not others without
consequences is the epitome of arbitrariness—an infirmity that the Supreme Court has
long recognized152 and that the Supreme Court has taken seriously in the context of
removal proceedings. Indeed, recently in Sessions v. Dimaya, the Supreme Court found
147 Ramanujan Nadadur, Note, Beyond Crimmigration and the Civil-Criminal Dichotomy—
Applying Mathews v. Eldridge in the Immigration Context, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J.
141, 147 (2013) (applying Mathews v. Eldridge balancing to three groups of noncitizens and
finding that certain vulnerable groups of noncitizens merit additional procedural safeguards);
Bradley J. Wyatt, Note, Even Aliens are Entitled to Due Process: Extending Mathews v.
Eldridge Balancing to Board of Immigration Appeals Procedural Reforms, 12 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 605, 635 (2004) (applying Mathews v. Eldridge balancing and finding that
“[c]onstitutional due process minimums should extend to procedures before the BIA”); see
also Gindin, supra note 55, at 669.
148 Escudero-Corona v. INS, 244 F.3d 608, 614 (8th Cir. 2001) (alteration in original)
(quoting Afolagan v. INS, 219 F.3d 784, 789 (8th Cir. 2000)).
149 See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2).
150 See id.
151 See, e.g., United States v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885, 888 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138
S. Ct. 2623 (2018).
152 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (citing Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S.
114, 123 (1889)) (“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against
arbitrary action of government.”).
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that a vague criminal statute incorporated into the INA as a possible ground for de-
portability was unconstitutionally vague in part because it “invited arbitrary enforce-
ment.”153 While this holding hinged upon the vagueness of a statute that served as the
ground for possible deportation rather than the mandatory procedures related to dis-
cretionary relief, the reasoning of the Court emphasized the fear of judges applying the
statutes inconsistently without proper notice to respondents.154 There, the Court
enumerated a litany of issues related to the application of the vague statute in question
among circuit courts, writing, “Does car burglary qualify as a violent felony under sec-
tion 16(b)? Some courts say yes, another says no. What of statutory rape? Once again,
the Circuits part ways. How about evading arrest? The decisions point in different di-
rections. Residential trespass? The same is true.”155 In short, the statute “‘produce[d]
more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates.’”156
Again, while Dimaya was concerned with a vague statute related to deportability
grounds themselves, the issues raised regarding arbitrariness and proper notice in
removal proceedings should similarly give cause for concern where an agency fol-
lows its own regulations inconsistently to the detriment of a respondent who, in the
words of Justice Kagan, faces “deportation[, which] is ‘a particularly severe penalty,’
[and] which may be of greater concern to a convicted alien than ‘any potential jail
sentence.’”157 Indeed, failure to hold immigration judges accountable for their duties
under the regulation will lead to variable results for similarly situated respondents,
as some may be notified of their apparent eligibility for discretionary relief, while
others may not.158
This variability in outcomes is also likely to hinder the government’s ability to
effectively prioritize which respondents in removal proceedings might be deserving
of a waiver. In INA section 212(h), Congress seemingly provided for the possibility
of a waiver of deportation to mitigate the harshness of INA deportability grounds
through consideration of a number of factors, including how long ago a respondent’s
crime had occurred and evidence of rehabilitation, as well as evidence of extreme
hardship to U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouses, parents, or children.159
While the same statute emphasizes that the waiver is in the Attorney General’s dis-
cretion,160 the Executive Office for Immigration Review also seemingly incorporated
provisions in its regulations to mitigate the harshness of possible deportation grounds
153 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223 (2018).
154 Id. at 1210–23.
155 Id. at 1222 (footnotes omitted).
156 Id. at 1223 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2558 (2015)).
157 Id. at 1213 (quoting Jae Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2017)).
158 See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) (2013).
159 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(A)–(B) (2012).
160 Id. § 1182(h) (“The Attorney General may, in his discretion, waive the application of
subparagraphs (A)(i)(I), (B), (D), and (E) of subsection (a)(2) and subparagraph (A)(i)(II)
of such subsection insofar as it relates to a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams
of marijuana if . . . [the following criteria are met].”).
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by providing mandatory procedural protections for respondents that stated “[t]he
immigration judge shall inform the alien of his or her apparent eligibility to apply
for any of the benefits enumerated in this chapter [including a waiver of a ground of
inadmissibility] and shall afford the alien an opportunity to make application during
the hearing . . . .”161
Should the IJ fail intermittently and arbitrarily to perform his or her duty to inform
and provide a venue for a hearing on possible discretionary relief, the results are also
likely to be intermittent and arbitrary. Two identical respondents, each charged with the
same ground of deportability, and each with the same equities rendering them eligible
for a waiver, might only be made aware of their eligibility for relief and afforded an op-
portunity to present their cases for relief if they are lucky enough to be placed in a re-
moval proceedings in the court of an immigration judge who follows the regulations.
Imagine a scenario where an indigent, lawful permanent resident is placed in
removal proceedings for a ground of inadmissibility triggered twenty years prior to
obtaining his lawful permanent residence, since which time he has been a model
resident of his community, and supports his U.S. citizen wife and three U.S. citizen
children through his employment. If he is placed in removal proceedings, unable to
afford legal counsel, and tries to prepare himself for the proceeding by reading the
Executive Office for Immigration Review’s regulations regarding a removal pro-
ceeding, could he not rely upon the IJ to inform him of his apparent eligibility for
relief? If the answer is no or sometimes, then does the Executive Office for Immi-
gration Review have to follow any of its regulations?
III. OTHER SUPPORT FOR THE MINORITY’S APPROACHES TO FINDING A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF APPARENT
ELIGIBILITY FOR DISCRETIONARY RELIEF
A. Jurisprudence Covering Discretion in the Prison Context Supports a Finding
of a Right to Be Informed of Apparent Eligibility for Discretionary Relief
Legal treatment of regulations regarding the use of discretion in the prison
context also lends support to finding a constitutionally protected due process right
to be informed of eligibility for discretionary relief in removal proceedings.162 In-
formative parallels can be drawn in the context of parole and prison transfer.
With respect to parole for instance, the Supreme Court in Board of Pardons v.
Allen observed the possibility of the creation of a liberty interest related to a prisoner’s
possibility of obtaining parole.163 There the Court observed that the statute’s “use[]
[of the] mandatory language (‘shall’) . . . ‘creat[ed] a presumption that parole release
will be granted’ when the designated findings are made,” despite the fact that the parole
161 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) (emphasis added).
162 See infra notes 164–83 and accompanying text.
163 482 U.S. 369, 373–78 (1987), superseded by statute, MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-201
(2015).
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board had the authority to use its discretion to determine when a given prisoner
“believes that the prisoner is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-
abiding citizen.”164 Similarly, while INA section 212(h) grants the Attorney General
the ultimate discretionary authority to grant or deny waivers,165 the Executive Office
of Immigration Review’s use of the mandatory language “shall” in 8 C.F.R. section
1240.11(a)(2)166 creates a presumption that respondents will be informed of their
apparent eligibility for relief and given an opportunity for a hearing on the same by
the immigration judge,167 notwithstanding the ultimate discretion of the Attorney
General to grant or deny the waiver.
In the context of transfer of prison inmates, the determination of whether a con-
stitutional due process protection might arise depends on whether the government
official’s discretion is limited by the state’s rules.168 In Olim v. Wakinekona, the Su-
preme Court found that there was no protected liberty interest created by Hawaii’s
prison regulations governing the transfer of prison inmates because “officials may
transfer a prisoner ‘for whatever reason or for no reason at all’” and as such, “there
is no . . . interest for process to protect.”169 In removal proceedings, while the Attorney
General may use his discretion in choosing to award the ultimate discretionary relief
based on grounds enumerated by Congress,170 the immigration judge is not given such
discretion in his duty to inform the respondent of his apparent eligibility for discre-
tionary relief.171 Instead, the IJ must, upon review of the pertinent facts in the record,
inform the respondent of his eligibility for discretionary relief based in an enumer-
ated regulatory list of possible grounds for waivers.172 Importantly, the regulation
does not give the IJ the discretion to forego such a requirement for any reason.173
It is important to note that the Supreme Court has expressed caution in relying
too heavily on mandatory language in the due process context. For instance, in
Sandin v. Conner, the Court noted “two undesirable effects” of finding due process
property interests rooted in the mandatory language of prison regulations: (1) that “it
creates disincentives for States to codify prison management procedures in the interest
of uniform treatment”; and (2) that it “le[ads] to the involvement of federal courts
in the day-to-day management of prisons, often squandering judicial resources with
164 Id. at 376–78 (citations omitted).
165 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).
166 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) (“The immigration judge shall inform the alien of his or her
apparent eligibility to apply for any of the benefits enumerated in this chapter [including a
waiver of a ground of inadmissibility] and shall afford the alien an opportunity to make ap-
plication during the hearing . . . .” (emphasis added)).
167 Cf. Allen, 482 U.S. at 373–78.
168 See, e.g., Olim v. Wakinekona 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983).
169 Id. (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228 (1976)).
170 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(2).
171 See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2).
172 See id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).
173 See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2).
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little offsetting benefit to anyone.”174 In the context of removal proceedings, such
concerns are muted. For the former, uniform treatment of respondents would best
be served by having immigration judges consistently carry out their regulatory duty
to inform respondents of their apparent eligibility of discretionary relief, rather than
informing some and not others arbitrarily. For the latter, following the regulatory
duty consistently will more effectively help immigration judges to serve a gate-
keeping function to determine upon their initial review of the record a respondent’s
“apparent” eligibility for relief, thereby weeding out possible frivolous claims that
might otherwise waste limited judicial resources.
In addition, Sandin still allowed for the possibility of a prison regulation that
gives rise to a due process protection,175 but insisted that “a deprivation [of such
interest must be] sufficiently ‘atypical and significant’ to warrant procedural due
process protections.”176 The Court did not elaborate greatly on the meaning of the
phrase “atypical and significant,” but indicated that “segregated confinement did not
present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceiv-
ably create a liberty interest,” because such a procedure “does not present a dramatic
departure from the basic conditions of [the prisoner’s] indeterminate sentence.”177
The failure of an immigration judge to inform a respondent of apparent eligibil-
ity of relief from removal will undoubtedly be both significant and atypical. It is
significant because a failure to present an application for relief will foreclose the
possibility of preventing the serious consequence of deportation.178 It is atypical bec-
ause such a failure handicaps a respondent’s ability to make the best argument for
their case to remain in the United States179 in a manner that constitutes “a dramatic
departure from the basic conditions”180 outlined in the final stage of a removal
proceeding where the Immigration Court entertains applications for relief.181
In this way, jurisprudence from the prison context supports a finding that the perti-
nent immigration regulations have placed substantive limits on the role of the immigra-
tion judge in administering the removal proceeding in a way that created a due process
protection for respondents.182 While the courts have exercised some caution in relying
174 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995).
175 See id. at 483–84 (“[W]e recognize that States may under certain circumstances create
liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause. . . . But these interests will
be generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . nonetheless imposes atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”).
176 Donna H. Lee, The Law of Typicality: Examining the Procedural Due Process Impli-
cations of Sandin v. Conner, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 785, 788 (2004).
177 Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484–86.
178 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (2012) (“A court may review a final order of removal only if—(1)
the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right . . . .”).
179 See id.
180 Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485.
181 Christen Chapman, Relief From Deportation: An Unnecessary Battle, 44 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1529, 1570–73 (2011) (describing the relief stage of the removal proceeding).
182 See supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text.
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too heavily on the mandatory language itself, the nature of the interest being deprived
here—i.e., critical information pertinent to allowing a respondent to avoid possible
deportation—is sufficiently atypical and significant to allay such concerns.183
B. Public Policy Supports a Finding of a Right to Be Informed of Apparent
Eligibility for Discretionary Relief
The vast majority of immigrants detained in removal proceedings are unrepre-
sented.184 Indeed, “Only 37 percent of all immigrants have an attorney to represent
them in immigration court,” and as many as “[e]ighty-six percent of immigrants who’ve
been detained will appear without a lawyer.”185 By not enforcing the IJ’s regulatory
obligation to inform a pro se respondent of possible eligibility for relief,186 courts
hinder the ability of respondents to effectively present reasons for why they should
remain in the country pursuant to statutory guidelines regarding relief from removal.187
As such, this handicap is likely to lead to an increase in incidences of removals—even
of those who may have sympathetic grounds for relief, such as ties to U.S. families188—
and exacerbate the observed negative impacts of deportation proceedings more
generally on U.S. families.
The negative effects of deportation on U.S. families and communities is well-
documented.189 In a recent interview with families that had one family member de-
ported, the Kaiser Family Foundation observed extensive psychological, financial,
and medical hardships.190 These included financial hardships that caused food in-
security and worries about covering necessary expenses like rent, “Disruption to Child-
ren’s Routines and Relationships,” “Extreme Stress, Anxiety, and Depression,” “Abrupt
Declines in School Performance,” “Fear of Accessing Public Programs,” “Gaps in
Support and Resources” for families, and “Fear and Uncertainty for the Future.”191
A recent review of scholarship on the subject confirmed similar findings regarding
families, noting that “[f]amily members left behind suffer multiple psychological
183 See supra notes 175–77 and accompanying text.
184 See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
185 Fatma Marouf, What Makes Immigration Court Different from Typical Judicial
Proceedings?, PAC. STANDARD (June 25, 2018), https://psmag.com/social-justice/how-does
-immigration-court-work [https://perma.cc/H33H-B67Q].
186 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11 (a)(2) (2013).
187 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012) (discussing the various avenues that a respondent
may have for relief in removal proceedings).
188 See, e.g., id. § 1182(h)(1)(B).
189 See, e.g., Kalina M. Brabeck et al., The Psychological Impact of Detention and Depor-
tation on U.S. Migrant Children and Families, 84 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 496 (2014).
190 Samantha Artiga & Barbara Lyons, Family Consequences of Detention/Deportation:
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consequences,” which included “economic hardship, housing instability, and food
insecurity,” new roles for remaining caregivers and children, poor school performance,
as well as “emotional and behavioral challenges, such as eating and sleeping changes,
anxiety, sadness, anger, and withdrawal.”192 The psychological damage to children
can last for their lifetime.193
The consequences of deportation for communities are also grave. Specifically, “im-
migration raids and deportations” often leave “community members . . . more fearful
and mistrustful of public institutions, less likely to participate in churches, schools,
health clinics, cultural activities, and social services, and more reluctant to report
crime to the police.”194
Recognizing that a respondent in removal proceedings has a constitutional due
process right to be informed of possible discretionary relief from removal is not a
cure-all for the woes of deportation enumerated above; it would, however, help
ensure that respondents who appear to be eligible for a waiver of deportation on
grounds identified by Congress—including those whose removal might cause “ex-
treme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son,
or daughter, of such alien,”195 are properly informed of such a possibility and af-
forded a hearing to present their case for the same.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
To ensure that similarly situated respondents in removal proceedings receive
consistent treatment from immigration judges moving forward, the Supreme Court
should take up a case that resolves the current circuit split and recognize that there
exists a constitutional due process protection to be informed of the possibility of
eligibility for discretionary relief. Such a measure is necessary to safeguard against
arbitrariness in the judicial administration of removal proceedings.
192 Statement on the Effects of Deportation and Forced Separation on Immigrants, Their
Families, and Communities, 62 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 3, 4 (2018), https://doi.org/10
.1002/ajcp.12256 [https://perma.cc/E56N-DAA2] [hereinafter Statement on the Effects of
Deportation].
193 Fernando Stein, AAP Statement on Protecting Immigrant Children, AM. ACAD. PEDI-
ATRICS (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.aap.org/en-us/about-the-aap/aap-press-room/Pages/AA
PStatementonProtectingImmigrantChildren.aspx [https://perma.cc/MX2C-H29T] (“When
children are scared, it can impact their health and development. Indeed, fear and stress, par-
ticularly prolonged exposure to serious stress—known as toxic stress—can harm the devel-
oping brain and negatively impact short- and long-term health.”); see also Johayra Bouza et
al., The Science Is Clear: Separating Families Has Long-Term Damaging Psychological and
Health Consequences for Children, Families, and Communities, SOC’Y RES.CHILD DEV.
(June 20, 2018), http://www.srcd.org/sites/default/files/documents/the_science_is_clear.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6T9U-U2CM] (discussing the harmful impacts of the separation of family
members in the enforcement of immigration policies).
194 Statement on the Effects of Deportation, supra note 192, at 4.
195 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B) (2012).
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Notably, immigration judges are entrusted with a role in immigration proceed-
ings to not act solely as common-law arbiters between two civil parties. Indeed,
Christen Chapman has argued that we should treat immigration judges in the relief
stage of a proceeding in a fashion similar to the “non-adversarial,” civil law inquisi-
torial judges.196 However, I would posit that immigration judges already occupy this
quasi-inquisitorial, administrative role by nature of the regulations requiring that
they develop the administrative record197 and advise respondents of their apparent
eligibility for relief from removal proceedings.198 By creating an expectation through
its regulations that the IJ will play this administrative function,199 the Executive
Office of Immigration Review has already signaled to unrepresented respondents
that it will inform them of apparent eligibility for a waiver, thereby helping those
who might merit an opportunity to remain in the United States on grounds deemed
pertinent by Congress to make their case before the Attorney General.
Such regulations, however, need the support of a judiciary to ensure that they
are not enforced arbitrarily, or not at all. By extending constitutional due process
protections to the right to be informed of discretionary relief found in Executive
Office of Immigration Review regulations, courts moving forward are positioned to
protect such a vulnerable population from arbitrary enforcement of procedures de-
signed to provide substantive, informative benefits to respondents in removal
proceedings regarding their possibilities of remaining in the United States.
CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit in Estrada erred in finding no constitutional due process
protection for the right to be informed of eligibility for discretionary relief by
improperly analyzing the nature of the property or liberty issue at stake, raising an
increasingly questionable observation that removal proceedings are purely “civil”
in nature, and construing notions of “fairness” for respondents in removal proceed-
ings in a way that is, above all, arbitrary. The Supreme Court’s recent decision to deny
certiorari in the case means that for the foreseeable future, similarly situated respon-
dents in removal proceedings in different circuits will have immigration judges held
196 Chapman, supra note 181, at 1529–30 (“This Article argues that immigration courts
should shift to a nonadversarial model at the relief stage of removal hearings. In a nonadver-
sarial relief stage, the ICE attorney would withdraw and the immigration judge would adopt an
inquisitorial role. Such a shift would provide noncitizens with an opportunity to present their
applications for relief under procedures that comport with the Due Process Clause, accommodate
the government’s immigration enforcement goals, and impose insubstantial administrative costs
on the immigration court system.”).
197 United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 2004) (“IJs have a duty to develop
the administrative record, and . . . our removal system relies on IJs to explain the law accu-
rately to pro se aliens.”).
198 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11 (2013).
199 Id.
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to different standards with possibly different implications for their ability to present
applications for waivers based on their prima facie eligibility.
Deportation presents grave consequences—removal from family, home, work,
and communities. By the same token, the government has a weighty interest in en-
suring the safety of communities and national security in carrying out its policies
regarding deportation. Both of these interests though, are best served through recogni-
tion that noncitizens in removal proceedings have a constitutionally protected right
to be informed of possible eligibility of relief from deportation, as such a right helps
ensure that those individuals Congress recognized might merit a waiver receive the
necessary information and opportunity to make their case. Such a finding is supported
both by due process jurisprudence in the context of removal proceedings and other
discretionary contexts like prison parole and transfer, as well as public policy. Indeed,
such a finding would be consistent with “[t]he touchstone of due process”—namely,
“protecti[ng] the individual against arbitrary action of government.”200
200 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (citing Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S.
114, 123 (1889)).
